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NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Shulman
and Goldstein: Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalr

examples of the writer’s art will be pleasantly surprised, for thought-provoking
and fascinating assertions abound. For
example, Whaley believes that some
societies are more deceptive than others,
“but only during any given slice of time.”
Deception is also, according to Whaley,
a mind game that can be learned,
although certain types of people,
including magicians and practical jokers,
may find the game easier to master.
Despite taking the reader on a
rather fast-paced ride over centuries
of deception efforts, Whaley makes
several points with care. The first is that
deception operations are not guaranteed
success. Two failures cited are the Bay of
Pigs invasion, for which Whaley holds
CIA veteran Richard Bissell responsible,
and the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue
mission, with Jody Powell coming in
for censure. The second point is that
deception operations are not important
in and of themselves; they are only as
important as the degree to which they
support the commander’s operational
plan and allow the attainment of desired
objectives. As we face a future in
which deception operations can be
expected to flourish, Whaley’s cautionary note is well worth remembering.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the
Emerging US-China Rivalry, by Lyle J. Goldstein.
Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2015.
400 pages. $29.95.

Numerous Western observers—expert
and otherwise—have opined about the
implications of the rise of China. A
small number address the implications
for hundreds of millions of people
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who have moved from subsistence
living into the middle classes. A few
more address the consequences for the
world’s economy, environment, or rule
of law. But most focus on an emerging
rivalry with the United States and the
possibility it will lead to superpower
conflict. Of these, Naval War College
professor Lyle Goldstein is virtually
alone in mapping out specific plans
to avoid friction, de-escalate tensions,
and cultivate peaceful coexistence; the
others offer “realist” solutions designed
to isolate, deter, or defeat China.
Dr. Goldstein—the founding director
of the College’s China Maritime Studies
Institute, and fluent in Mandarin—
brings the right tools to the task of
analyzing the United States–China
rivalry and setting a course toward
peaceful coexistence. A political
scientist with strong appreciation for the
influence of history on strategy, he has
read widely in Chinese and English to
understand how academics and leaders
in each country view their nation’s
experience, interests, and destiny. By
sorting out these perspectives, Goldstein
works like a mediator to chart the
narrow and winding pathways to trust
and cooperation. He dedicates nine
chapters to distinct issues that divide the
United States and China, categorized by
region (for instance, Japan or the South
China Sea) or by sector (the economy or
the environment). After describing the
overall picture, each chapter examines
interpretations in the West and then in
China, offering particularly valuable
insights into the perspectives of Chinese
military and strategic thought leaders.
Having toured the strategic horizon
and explained the relevant attitudes
and interests, the author then lays out
“cooperation spirals”—plans whereby
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each side can take concrete, sequential
steps to reduce the threat they are
perceived to pose and to increase opportunities for cooperation. These plans
generally start out small, then grow in
ambition. Many focus on measures that
reduce the appearance of an aggressive
U.S. militarized posture—for example,
standing down AFRICOM or reducing
the number of troops stationed on
Okinawa. In recognition of the fact
that the United States can afford some
rebalancing, subsequent steps include
expanding China’s military commitments—for instance, to a joint antipiracy
force for Aden or a trip-wire force based
in North Korea. Meeting China halfway
is not just a slogan. Goldstein understands that the Chinese (indeed, much
of the world) view America’s history as
one of nearly continuous aggression,
and they need to see retrenchment
before they will trust the United
States not to threaten their regime.
Written in 2014 and published in
2015, the book is still highly topical
and informative about Chinese-U.S.
relations, and the concept of cooperation
spirals remains appealing. Readers
will note, however, that we live in
interesting times. The Philippines’
position has undergone two dramatic
shifts, first in prevailing in the South
China Sea arbitration and then with
the election of Rodrigo Duterte and the
subsequent warming toward China.
Likewise, the new U.S. president, Donald
Trump, canceled the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, announced a withdrawal
from the Paris Climate Accord, and is
taking a much more aggressive attitude
toward Iran—each of which moots
one of Goldstein’s cooperation spirals.
Finally, China’s trillion-dollar commitment to the Belt and Road project
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likewise signals a shift in ambition
and interests. So, while Goldstein’s
insights and his concept for reconciliation remain powerful, policy makers
today will need a new set of plans.
This remains an important book for
anyone seeking to understand U.S.Chinese relations, particularly those
seeking peaceful solutions so as to
avoid the so-called Thucydides trap.
MARK R. SHULMAN

Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the
World’s Oceans, by James Stavridis. New York:
Penguin, 2017. 384 pages. $28.

Admiral James Stavridis’s maritime opus,
Sea Power, is a tour de force that ranges
across the global commons of the world’s
vast sea-lanes and both near-littoral
and distant shores. With four decades
of distinguished maritime service in the
U.S. Navy, the admiral (now retired) is
uniquely qualified to evaluate current
geopolitical maritime realities. Stavridis
brings that strategic perspective to
his historical contextualization of
how and why oceans have impacted
seafaring and landlocked civilizations
and nation-states differentially.
Stavridis is a prolific author, having first
been published, early in his naval officer
career, in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. As someone who has embodied
that institution’s motto to “dare to
write, think, and speak to advance the
understanding of sea power,” he now
fittingly serves as chair of the institute.
As he does in that role, in Sea Power
Stavridis continues to lead and shape
the intellectual conversation surrounding sea power and the sea services.
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